Child pages
  • RPKI Validation
Skip to end of metadata
Go to start of metadata

Attacks against the routing system are increasing, and it's not uncommon in today's Internet world to experience prefix hijacking.  The IETF has for a while, been woking on an Internet Resource Public Key Infrastructure, to help validate routing (BGP) announcements.  

Details on RPKI and how this works is best followed up through your RIR.  The RIPE-NCC in particular have excellent resources for you to peruse, and another excellent set of guidelines is available at  INX runs separate workshops on IRR and RPKI usage, so look out for our announcements, and.

At INX-ZA, we operate a few RPKI validators that we use in production, and which we make available to the general public for use.  These are spread across the country, and are freely available for you to use to validate your prefixes.  We stongly  recommend that each network implements their own set of validators, and provide these for use as backup and/or failover validators primarily for peers at the INXes, who are typically one network hop away.  We place no restriction on reasonable use.

  •  (Routinator 3000)
  •  (GoRTR)
  •  (Routinator 3000)
  • (GoRTR)
  •  (Routinator 3000)

  •  (coming soon)

Of course the point of RPKI validation is for your network equipment to do this automatically, so we suggest the following configuration: 

RPKI Config
router bgp 65001
 bgp rpki server tcp <<host>> port 3323 refresh 900

All of the hosts are dual-stacked;  please remember to use the v6 addresses, if your router supports IPv6.


From June 2019, INX drops RPKI invalids on our BGP Route server service.  Details for these, and other filtered routes, can be seen directly, from the view into the INX BGP-RS services.


We recommend that you

  • assign a higher local-pref to prefixes that have a Valid ROA
  • leave prefixes with Not-Found ROAs untouched
  • drop prefixes with Invalid ROA

Dealing with Invalids

Operators may be tempted to choose an approach where they set the local-pref of Invalids to something really low (ie. least preferred).  The simple problem you're still likely to see is that a more-specific (ie. longer match) route for this, will still win in the BGP route selection process, and therefore still leave you vulnerable to attack.  

Should you need assistance with this, please feel free to send a mail to ops [at]